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Taking into account non-constant marginal costs, this paper con-
siders the eects of a tari cut combined with a consumption tax in-
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11 Introduction
A tari reduction is one of the most important driving forces behind rapid
growth of world trade. In an inuential work, Baier and Bergstrand (2001,
p. 22) report evidence suggesting that `tari reductions still explain almost
three times as much trade growth as transport-cost declines.' As the tradi-
tional trade theory claims, growth of world trade is potentially gainful for
not only an individual country but also the world. Nevertheless, a num-
ber of developing countries have a concern over trade liberalization for fear
that it induces government revenue losses. In order to compensate for them,
several countries have introduced another tax, e.g., a consumption tax or
a value-added tax (VAT).1 However, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010, p. 571)
empirically nd that `for low income countries, implying no impact on the
extent of revenue recovery.'
Given these growing interests in the empirical literature, there is a the-
oretical literature that examines the eects of tari-tax reforms. While this
paper is along this line of research, we focus on one specic tari-tax reform,
which is increasingly recognized in the literature, in a context of imperfect
competition. The policy reform we study consists of one unit of tari re-
duction and the same unit of consumption tax increase. This policy reform,
which is rst addressed by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), is welfare-improving
for a competitive small open economy. Keen and Ligthart (2002) general-
ize this result, but the same authors (Keen and Ligthart (2005)) show that
the same no longer survives imperfect competition. Concretely, assuming a
duopoly served by a domestic and a foreign duopolists, and linear demand
and marginal costs, Keen and Ligthart (2005) demonstrate that the point-
by-point reform necessarily reduces welfare.
The nding of Keen and Ligthart (2005) is striking, but it deserves fur-
ther investigations since it rests on many simplifying assumptions.2 This
paper revisits their result by paying special attention to the role of non-
constant marginal costs. As is rst illustrated by Krugman (1984), non-
constant marginal costs allow a policy change to have a secondary (spillover)
2eect through a change in each rm's marginal cost. We show that the point-
by-point policy reform can improve welfare under decreasing marginal cost
whereas Keen and Ligthart's (2005) result is valid under increasing marginal
costs.
Another purpose of this paper is to look at the eect of the tari-tax
reform on market access, which is dened by a value of import volumes at
the world price. The reason for considering the market access eect is that
market access issues have an increasing importance in the real world. In a
model of a competitive small open economy, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-
Mller (2008) prove that the point-by-point policy reform may fail to increase
market access although it does raise welfare and government revenue. To our
knowledge, there is no previous work that addresses the market access aspect
of the tari-tax reform under imperfect competition. This paper fullls this
gap.
Apart from the tari-tax literature, there is another strand of literature
on trade policies that incorporates non-constant marginal costs. Although
the assumption of constant marginal cost is analytically convenient and fre-
quently made in literature, it is not surprisingly natural that marginal costs
are non-constant. For example, in many manufacturing industries, decreasing
marginal costs through R&D, learning-by-doing and developments of commu-
nication networks are profoundly observed.3 In this sense, it is an important
task to explore whether the policy outcomes under the assumption of con-
stant marginal cost are survives the more realistic assumption of non-constant
marginal costs. To our knowledge, Krugman (1984) is the rst to seek this
objective in the trade policy literature. While Krugman's (1984) argument
is mainly based on a diagrammatic approach, Uekawa (1994) examines wel-
fare eects of multiple trade policies with a rigorously mathematical model.
Developing a formal model, Zhang and Zhang (1998) mathematically for-
malize Krugman's (1984) argument. In a monopoly model, Ishikawa (2004),
Ishikawa and Kuroda (2007), and Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008a, 2008b)
also demonstrate that the eects of trade policies including trade liberaliza-
3tion crucially depend on whether marginal costs are increasing, constant, or
decreasing, as well as demand behavior.
This paper is planned as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section 3
seeks welfare eects of the point-by-point tari-tax reform suggested above,
and Section 4 turns to its eects on government revenue and market ac-
cess. Section 5 concludes. Appendix presents the detailed derivation of key
equations in the main text.
2 A Model
Consider a market of a country, say Home, in which a Home rm and a
Foreign rm play a Cournot-Nash game. Denoting by p(x + y) the inverse
demand function of the Home consumer, where x and y are the output of
the Home and Foreign rms, respectively, and p() is strictly decreasing, i.e.,
p0() < 0. Both rms have a production cost c(x) and c(y), the marginal
cost of which is either increasing, constant, or decreasing.4
The government levies a specic import tari t  0 and a consumption
tax   0.5 Given these assumptions, the prot of each rm is dened by
Home rm : p(x + y)x   c(x)   x
Foreign rm : p(x + y)y   c(y)   y   ty;
by noting that the world market price of the duopolized good is p      t
since p is the price at which the Home consumer purchases, i.e., it is the
world price plus the consumption tax and tari.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are determined by the system of
the rst-order conditions for prot maximization:
xp
0(x + y) + p(x + y)   c
0(x)    = 0 (1)
yp
0(x + y) + p(x + y)   c
0
(y)      t = 0; (2)









4Totally dierentiating (1) and (2), we have
"
xp00 + 2p0   c00(x) xp00 + p0








































xp00 + 2p0   c00(x)

; (4)













which is assumed to be positive from the stability of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.8
3 Welfare Eects
Welfare of the Home country W consists of consumer surplus CS, the Home
rm's prot , consumption tax revenue, and tari revenue:





p(X)dX   (x + y)p(x + y) (6)
 = p(x + y)x   c(x)   x (7)
consumption tax revenue = (x + y) (8)
tari revenue = ty; (9)
and x and y are the function of  and t from (1) and (2). Using (6)-(9) and
dierentiating (5) with respect to  and t, we obtain
@W(;t)
@




















5The policy reform suggested by Keen and Ligthart (2005) is dened by
d =  dt > 0, namely one unit of tari reduction is accompanied by one unit













Eq. (12) allows us to nd that the sign of @W=@   @W=@t crucially de-
pends on that of the Foreign rm's marginal cost. Formally, we can establish:
Proposition 1. The welfare eects of the point-by-point tari-tax reform
are summarized as:
(1) If demand is linear and c00
(y)  0, it reduces welfare.
(2) If c0(x) = c0
(y) and both rms' marginal cost is non-decreasing, it reduces
welfare.
(3) If demand is linear and c00
(y) < 0, it can improve welfare.
Proof. See Appendix. jj
(Figures 1 and 2 around here)
Let us seek intuitions behind Proposition 1 by the help of Figures 1 and
2. Suppose that the pre-reform Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by N in
the gures. One unit of tari reduction accompanied with the same unit of
consumption tax increase shifts only the Home rm's reaction curve inward
to the dotted locus without aecting the Foreign rm's reaction curve. As
6a result, the Home rm's output decreases, and the Foreign rm's output
increases. As Keen and Ligthart (2005) argue, this prot-shifting into the
Foreign country is the key for their result that this policy reform reduces
welfare.
In contrast, the same is no longer the case under non-constant marginal
costs since a change in outputs has a secondary eect on the reaction curves
through a change in marginal costs. Under increasing marginal costs, a
decrease in the Home rm's output lowers its marginal cost, and the opposite
holds for the Foreign rm. Therefore, the Home rm's reaction curve shifts
outward to the dashed locus while the Foreign rm's reaction curve shrinks.
Hence, the post-reform Cournot-Nash equilibrium becomes N0 at which the
prot-shifting eect is partially oset since N00 would be the new equilibrium
where marginal costs were constant. The Home rm's output expansion that
occurs as a secondary eect raises its cost and hence price, which is another
reason for a welfare loss. To sum, under increasing marginal costs, welfare is
likely to deteriorate than the constant marginal costs case.
On the other hand, the rst eect on outputs shifts the Home rm's
reaction curve inward further, and the Foreign rm's reaction curve outward
further (see Figure 2). At the resulting equilibrium N0, the prot-shifting is
larger than the constant marginal costs case. Nevertheless, it is possible for
welfare to improve because it allows both the marginal cost of the Foreign rm
and the price to fall, which benets the Home consumer. Consequently, there
is a possibility of a welfare improvement in the case of decreasing marginal
costs.
Remark 1. Simple examples may make sense for Proposition 1. The most
frequently adopted example of increasing marginal costs is a quadratic cost
function c(x) = cx2=2 and c(y) = cy2=2, where c is a positive constant. Then,
if c is large enough, the above policy reform proves to welfare-reducing.
An example exhibiting decreasing marginal costs is c(x) = 1   exp( bx)
and c(y) = 1   exp( by), where b is a positive constant, and measures the
7concavity (the degree of decreasing marginal cost). With suciently high b,
the policy reform can be gainful.10
Remark 2. While the foregoing arguments focus on the Home welfare, we
briey address the eect on Foreign welfare, which is measured by the prot
of the Foreign rm. Letting (;t) denote the Foreign rm's prot in the
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where the second equation uses the rst-order condition for the Foreign rm's
prot maximization (2), and the comparative statics results (3) and (4). The
positivity follows from the second-order condition for prot-maximization
yp00 +2p0  c00
(y) < 0. Consequently, Foreign will agree to the point-by-point
tari-tax reform suggested in the sense that the reform improves the Foreign
welfare irrespective of the sign of c00
(y).
4 Eects on Government Revenue and Mar-
ket Access
While the last section has focused on the welfare eect of the policy reform,
this section turns to the other eects of it. Throughout this section, we exclu-
sively focus on the linear demand case. The rst is the eect on government
revenue, and the second is the eect on market access.
4.1 Government Revenue Eect
The government revenue T is the sum of the consumption tax revenue and
the tari revenue, and given by
T(;t)  (x + y) + ty:
8A change in the consumption tax and tari is
@T(;t)
@















Thus, the eect of one unit of tari reduction accompanied by one unit








(y) + (   t)p0

: (13)
While the sign of (13) is generally ambiguous, Eq. (13) has an important
implication, which is:
Proposition 2. Suppose  < t. Then, under either constant or decreas-
ing marginal costs, the point-by-point policy reform increases the government
revenue. If, on the other hand, marginal costs are suciently strongly in-
creasing, the government revenue can decrease.12
Proof. Straightforward from (13). jj
The ambiguous result on the government revenue eect is parallel with
the nding of Keen and Ligthart (2005). However, what is worth noting is
that the positive eect is more likely under decreasing marginal costs than
constant marginal costs. This is because a large increase in the Foreign rm's
output favorably aects both the consumption tax revenue and tari revenue.
From the opposite reason, the government can lose from the reform under
increasing marginal costs since the output expansion of the Foreign rm is
mitigated as compared to the constant marginal costs case (see Figure 1 once
again).
4.2 Market Access Eect
The last eect we are interested in is the market access eect. As is in-
troduced in Introduction, this criterion of policy reform has an increasing
9importance, but it is not addressed in a context of imperfect competition.
This subsection fullls this gap by using the present generalized model of
Keen and Ligthart (2005). Following Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Mller
(2008, p. 87), we dene the market access M as `the value of imports at the
world market prices.'
M(;t)  [p(x + y)      t]y:


























Subtracting the latter from the former, and substituting (3) and (4) into












which is denitely positive. Therefore, we have arrived at:
Proposition 3. The point-by-point policy reform necessarily improves mar-
ket access whether marginal costs are constant or non-constant.
Proposition 3 gives a good feature of the suggested policy reform. Kre-
ickemeier and Raimondos-Mller (2008) prove that the same policy reform
does not necessarily improve market access in a competitive small open econ-
omy whereas it is welfare- and revenue-improving.14 In contrast, Proposition
3 suggests that the above skepticism no longer survives imperfect competi-
tion. In this sense, Proposition 3 has a certain importance in considering the
market access eect of the reform.
One of the most important implications obtained in our analysis is that
the point-by-point policy reform is not only easy to implement but also it can
involve a win-win-win outcome, i.e., it can enhance all of welfare, government
revenue, and market access particularly under decreasing marginal costs.
105 Concluding Remarks
Incorporating non-constant marginal costs into a model of Keen and Ligthart
(2005), we have examined the eect of a tari cut combined with a consump-
tion tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. It is
shown that all of these can improve as a result of the suggested policy reform
under decreasing marginal costs.
Despite the above novelty, our analysis needs more elaboration. For in-
stance, we have considered no inherent dynamic interaction between marginal
costs and outputs by simply assuming decreasing marginal costs which are
called static economies of scale. Alternatively, it is possible to build a dy-
namic game model of economies of scale as in Spence (1981). It is our future
research agenda to reconsider the robustness of our result in a richer setting.
Appendix
Derivation of (12) and Proof of Proposition 1





































(y)[ (x + y)p0 + ]   y (xp0 + t)p00 + [ (x + y)p0 + p   c0(x)   t]p0

;
where the last equation uses the rst-order condition for the Home rm's
prot maximization (1).
Making use of (12), statements (1) and (3) in Proposition 1 straight-
forwardly follow since the numerator of (12) with linear demand (p00 = 0)
becomes  c00
(y)[ (x + y)p0 + ] + [ (x + y)p0 + p   c0(x)   t]p0 < 0 when
11c00
(y)  0, and can be positive when the degree of c00
(y) < 0 is suciently
strong.
To prove statement (2), let us set c0(x) = c0
(y). Then, the numerator of
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where the second line eliminates  and t from the two rst-order conditions
(1) and (2), and the third line uses c0(x) = c0
(y). Taking into account
the second-order condition for the Foreign rm's prot maximization, and
c00
(y)  0, the above equation becomes negative, and hence we have arrived
at statement (2).
Derivation of (13)



































(y) + (   t)p0

;
where the second equation uses (3) and (4), and the third equation follows
from the assumption of linear demand.
Derivation of (14)















































where Eq. (15) comes from linear demand, and Eq. (16) uses (2), i.e.,
 + t = yp0 + p   c0
(y). The positivity of (14) follows from the second-order
condition for the Foreign rm's prot maximization, 2p0   c00
(y) < 0.
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Notes
1. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) provide an empirical assessment of the
eect of the change in tax base on government revenue.
2. To our knowledge, Naito and Abe (2008) are the only previous work that
revisits Keen and Ligthart's (2005) result by using a vertically related model
of imperfect competition.
3. Dick (1994), Yan et al. (2008) and Thompson (2010) are an example of
an empirical study of R&D and learning-by-doing.
4. While it is interesting to allow for the case where one rm's marginal
cost is non-constant, and the other rm's marginal cost is constant, such a
possibility complicates the analysis so drastically that we assume away it.
Okuguchi and Serizawa (1996) address the above possibility in a context of
15strategic trade policies.
5. This paper assumes specic taxes because (i) we want to make the model
as close to Keen and Ligthart's (2005) as possible, and (ii) ad valorem taxes
make the analysis too complicated to obtain denite results.
6. In what follows, we employ simpler notations p0 and p00 to denote p0(x+y)
and p00(x + y).
7. Throughout this paper, it is presupposed that both rms are active in
equilibrium.
8. For the details of stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, see Zhang
and Zhang (1998).
9. The detailed derivation of this equation is left in Appendix.
10. Of course, b can not be too large due to the second-order condition for
prot maximization. Although it is possible to make a parallel example of a
linearly decreasing marginal cost c(x) = ex   fx2=2 and c(y) = ey   fy2=2,
where e and f are both positive, this example can not ensure a welfare
improvement.
11. The derivation of (13) is left in Appendix.
12. The assumption that  < t is empirically plausible and applicable to
many countries, particularly developing countries.
13. Eq. (14) is derived in details in Appendix.
14. See also Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) for














Figure 2: The eect of the policy reform: decreasing marginal costs
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